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Abstract
Within a fairly short amount of time, the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) has managed to put large swaths of land in
Syria and Iraq under their control. To many observers, the
sheer speed at which this “state” was established was dumb-
founding. To better understand the roots of this organization
and its supporters we present a study using data from Twitter.
We start by collecting large amounts of Arabic tweets refer-
ring to ISIS and classify them into pro-ISIS and anti-ISIS.
This classification turns out to be easily done simply using
the name variants used to refer to the organization: the full
name and the description as “state” is associated with sup-
port, whereas abbreviations usually indicate opposition. We
then “go back in time” by analyzing the historic timelines of
both users supporting and opposing and look at their pre-ISIS
period to gain insights into the antecedents of support. To
achieve this, we build a classifier using pre-ISIS data to “pre-
dict”, in retrospect, who will support or oppose the group. The
key story that emerges is one of frustration with failed Arab
Spring revolutions. ISIS supporters largely differ from ISIS
opposition in that they refer a lot more to Arab Spring upris-
ings that failed. We also find temporal patterns in the support
and opposition which seems to be linked to major news, such
as reported territorial gains, reports on gruesome acts of vio-
lence, and reports on airstrikes and foreign intervention.
Introduction
The recent rise and territorial gains of the “Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) (or simply the “Islamic State”) has
sparked significant interest in the group. One particular as-
pect of interest in ISIS is related to the profile of individ-
uals who are likely to join or merely support them. Since
the events of 9-11, there has been wide interest in identi-
fying necessary and sufficient traits individuals may posses
that are likely to propel them to support or join violent mil-
itant organizations. Contrary to popular belief, social psy-
chology studies and reviews suggest that individuals who
end up joining such organizations are typically more edu-
cated, financially better off, generally more accomplished
than average, and more exposed to Western culture (Louis
2009). Many studies have looked at whether such individ-
uals suffer from psychological disorders, but found no evi-
dence of such (Horgan 2003). On the contrary, they gener-
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ally exhibit higher than average psychological strength and
are far less traumatized by incarceration, interrogation, or
imprisonment (Miller 2006). In other words, they are not just
normal people, but rather they are normal people with better
than average fortunes. Since millions of people fit this de-
scription and the overwhelming majority of them do not re-
sort to violence, psychological traits are insufficient to iden-
tify people with violent tendencies. In a study of a leftist
group in India which resorted to violence (Sarangi and Al-
ison 2005), the twelve members of the group who were in-
terviewed provided similar personal narratives in which they
described structural deficiencies in their societies including
corruption, oppression, and lack of empowerment for cer-
tain segments of the society. Consequently, their personal
narratives painted a picture of those engaged in violence as
“heroes” who are confronting these deficiencies. The find-
ings of Sarangi and Alison (2005) are in line with the find-
ings of many other studies that show that people who re-
sort to violence do so to eliminate what they perceive as in-
justices (Plous and Zimbardo 2005). Along the same lines,
there has been a recent story that was publicized in the me-
dia concerning a man called Ahmed Al-Darawy, a successful
and affluent 38 year-old former manager in a multinational
company in Egypt, who was killed while fighting along-
side ISIS1. Al-Darawy was a former police officer, who left
the service to join the revolutionaries who toppled the for-
mer Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, and he later ran
for elected office in an embrace of democracy. Interviews
with his friends after his death painted a picture of a person
who was disillusioned and angry, particularly after the mil-
itary intervention against the democratically elected presi-
dent, Mohamed Morsi. Al-Darawy is highly prototypical of
people who resort to violence. Juergen Todenhoefer, a Ger-
man journalist who recently spent 10 days with ISIS, pro-
vided confirming testimony in which he said “These [ISIS
fighters] are not stupid people. One of the people we met
had just finished his law degree, he had great job offers,
but he turned them down to go and fight.2” There is evi-
dence in the literature that support for such militant groups
is mostly political, rather than religious (Abdulla 2007). In
1
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/
97130d46-7952-11e4-9567-00144feabdc0.html
2
http://www.newsweek.com/german-journalist-returns-time-isis-chilling-stories-293781
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short, Louis (2009) attributes the motivation to pursue vio-
lent means to the following beliefs: 1) “Alternatives to terror
do not work”; and 2) “Terrorism can achieve social change”.
In this paper, given Arab Twitter users (tweeps) with ex-
plicitly expressed positions supporting or opposing ISIS, we
seek to identify distinguishing features from their Twitter
profiles that foretell their future positions prior to authoring
the first tweet overtly declaring their stance. We examine the
interests of both groups before and after they started explic-
itly supporting or opposing ISIS. In line with the findings
in the literature, we attempt to analyze the motivations that
prompt people to support ISIS (not necessarily join them),
namely identifying perceived injustices that act as triggers.
We conducted the study on approximately 57 thousand
tweeps, who authored nearly 123 million tweets. The contri-
butions of this paper are as follows:
• We determine distinguishing language that signals current
support or opposition for ISIS.
• We train a classifier that can predict future support or op-
position of ISIS with %87 accuracy.
• We identify potential reasons for subsequent support of
ISIS and the sources of opposition to the group.
• We attempt to account for the profiles of people who cur-
rently support or oppose ISIS.
• We illustrate some of the underlying phenomena in the
group’s social media engagement.
Our analysis is broken down into two parts. After dis-
cussing related work and describing our data collection, we
first present a global trend analysis of trends in pro- vs. anti-
ISIS tweets. This provides insights into the effect of external
events, such as reports of territorial gains or videos of be-
headings, on the mobilization of supporters. After this, we
present an individual historic analysis where we put partic-
ular emphasis on the pre-ISIS period.
Background
ISIS and the Syrian Conflict Online
Militant groups have long used the internet and social me-
dia for communication, information gathering, recruitment,
and social network engagement (Cohen-Almagor 2012).
Though, specific literature on the use by ISIS of social media
is scant, there are strong indicators that the group seems to
be fairly media savvy with strong presence on different so-
cial media platforms(Shane and Hubbard 2014). For exam-
ple, ISIS (or its affiliates) maintain many Twitter accounts
that propagate the group’s message in several languages.
When accounts are taken down, new ones are quickly cre-
ated to replace them(Shane and Hubbard 2014). ISIS also
produces high quality videos in several languages as a re-
cruitment tool. For example, the group produced an English
video entitled “There is No Life Without Jihad” that featured
Western fighters that behoove others to join them(Kohlmann
and Alkhouri 2014). Much of the propaganda of ISIS is fo-
cused on reporting on military successes and ISIS’s success
in implementing different aspect of Sharia (Islamic law).
Though they were not the first to engage in this kind of
Figure 1: Number of terrorist attacks in Iraq per year
(source: Global Terrorism Database5)
media campaigns, they have eclipsed other militant groups,
such as Al-Qa’ida, in attracting new members. Their re-
cruitment success can be mostly attributed to their mili-
tary victories, particularly the capture of Mosul, Iraq’s sec-
ond largest city(Kohlmann and Alkhouri 2014). Kohlmann
and Alkhouri(2014) provide accounts of several individuals
who either joined or attempted to join ISIS or other militant
groups in Iraq and Syria. In most accounts, individuals ex-
pressed strong anti-American sentiment including one who
was filmed tearing his American passport and burning it, an-
other who said that killing American soldiers was justified,
and yet another who spoke of a war that the West was waging
against Muslims. Disdain for US intervention in the Middle
East seems to be a common theme among Arabs in specific
and Muslims in general(Jamal et al. 2014). Further, US mil-
itary intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan seems to coincide
with a sharp increase in terror attacks in both countries. Fig-
ure 1 shows a steady rise in terrorist attacks in Iraq starting in
2003 (the year that the US invaded Iraq). In most cases, indi-
viduals joining ISIS obtained information from the internet
which came in the form of tweets from notable individuals,
personal contact over social media, and online videos and
lectures. Thus, there are indications that the media strategy
of ISIS is effective in attracting supporters (Kohlmann and
Alkhouri 2014). The effectiveness of the social media strat-
egy of ISIS and the boost it received due to the US bombing
campaign against it has been reported on in the news3.
Though not explicitly focused on ISIS, other studies have
looked at Twitter communication in Syria during the on-
going conflict. O’Callaghan et al. (2014) performed a net-
work analysis of 652 Twitter accounts of Syrians engaged
in the conflict. These accounts were identified using Twitter
lists and their analysis revealed four general communities,
namely: (i) pro-Assad, (ii) Kurdish, (iii) secular/moderate
opposition, and (iv) Islamists, including supporters of ISIS.
Their analysis, performed before the major territorial gains
of ISIS, also involved content analysis of the Freebase6 con-
cepts assigned to YouTube videos that were uploaded by the
Twitter users. Our analysis takes a different angle and tries
to identify a wider range of users (57k, extracted from an
initial 165k) and, importantly, tries to go back in time to un-
3
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1N0RI0R520140917
6
https://developers.google.com/youtube/v3/guides/
searching_by_topic
derstand the antecedents of joining or merely supporting a
particular group. Another study has investigated the reac-
tions on Twitter in response to the 2013 Sarin Gas Attacks
near Damascus (Tyshchuk et al. 2014). Among other things,
they observed that “there was no immediate polarization of
opinions following the event”, and that “Twitter communi-
ties were too sparse to produce substantial amount of social
pressure to force an opinion/opinion shift”. Finally, Morstat-
ter et al. (Morstatter et al. 2013) have used geo-tagged tweets
from Syria to evaluate the bias between different sources and
sampling methods of Twitter data.
Using Online Data to Study Political Polarization
Our pro- vs. anti-ISIS angle can also be seen as a study
of online polarization. Polarization, usually along the po-
litical left vs. right dimension, has a long research his-
tory. One quantitative approach is the NOMINATE score
(Poole and Rosenthal 1985). It uses roll call data voting his-
tory from the U.S. senate and house of representatives to
can quantify the statement that U.S. politics follows a 1-
dimensional left-to-right schema. Focusing on online data,
polarization in U.S. politics has been studied in the setting
of blogger networks (Adamic and Glance 2005) and Twit-
ter (Conover et al. 2011) to name two influential studies.
Geographically and topically closer to ISIS, online polar-
ization and political violence has been studied using Twit-
ter data from Egypt (Weber, Garimella, and Batayneh 2013;
Borge-Holthoefer et al. 2015). The conflict between Israel
and Palestine and how it plays out on Twitter has also re-
cently been studied (Liu and Weber 2014). Though these
studies describe differences in the users who are part of the
two camps, none of these studies look at the antecedents or
attempts to explain what makes a user join or support one
side rather than another.
Data Collection
Since the majority of ISIS supporters come from the
Arab World, we focused our study on Arabic Twitter pro-
files. Figure 2 illustrates the steps we followed for data
collection. We first start by identifying tweets in Ara-
bic by continuously searching the Twitter Rest API with
the query “lang:ar”.7 From this set of Arabic tweets,
we then collected all tweets mentioning ISIS by any
of its name forms between mid October, 2014 and the
end of December, 2014. The name variations were of
two types, namely: those that used the full name of the
group such as “ éJ
ÓCB @
éËðYË@” (Aldawla Alislamiya – “Is-
lamic State”) and “ÐA Ë@ð @QªË@ ú

	¯ éJ
ÓCB @
éËðYË@” (Al-
dawla Alislamiya fi Aliraq walsham – “Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant”), and those that used the abbreviated version
of the name such as “ «@X” (da’esh – Arabic acronym for
the group), , “ú
æ
«@X” (da’eshy – from da’esh), and “ «@ðX”
(dawa’esh – plural of da’eshy).
7Using the language operator “lang:” on Twitter’s Streaming API would have
resulted in a dramatically reduced data set as the operator is provided on a post-sample
basis, i.e., after sampling down to 1% of tweets.
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Figure 2: Steps performed for data collection
In all, we collected 3.1 million Arabic tweets mention-
ing ISIS in some form, authored by more than 250k users
between Oct. 13, 2014 and Dec. 31, 2014. This data under-
lies our tweet-centric analysis. From these tweets we identi-
fied 180k tweeps during the period October 13, 2014 and
November 1, 2014. Of the 180k tweeps, only 165k had
active accounts for which we could obtain historic tweets
through the Twitter Rest API. By Nov. 17, 2014, the remain-
ing 15k accounts were either deleted by the user, suspended
by Twitter, or had their privacy settings set changed to “pro-
tected”.
Next, we were interested in distinguishing between those
who support and those who oppose ISIS. We found that the
name used to refer to the group was telling of whether a per-
son supports or opposes them. A native Arabic speaker, who
is well acquainted with the topic, judged a random sample
of 1,000 tweets that was spread uniformly across all days
for each condition as positive, negative, or neutral. Posi-
tive tweets included ones that praise the group, spreads their
messages, or report on them positively. Negative tweets in-
clude ones that attack the group and spreads negative news
about them. Neutral ones included those that merely report
news or spam tweets that use ISIS related hashtags to in-
crease their exposure.
Table 1 presents the percentage of tweets that support or
oppose ISIS based on whether they use; a) the full name
(or its variants); or b) the abbreviated name (or its variants).
As shown, using the full name of group is a strong indica-
tor of support for ISIS (93%), and using the acronyms is
a general indication of opposition (77%). For the 23% of
tweets that use the acronym, 7.5% support ISIS and 15% do
not reveal any specific leaning. The fact that both pro- and
anti-ISIS tweeps carefully choose how they refer to ISIS has
been observed by others before8. Based on the observation
that using the full name mostly indicates support and the ab-
8See e.g. http://www.ibtimes.com/
Search query Anti-ISIS Pro-ISIS Neutral/Spam
“ISIS” 77.3% 7.5% 15.2%
“Islamic State” 1.2% 93.1% 5.7%
Table 1: Percentage of pro-/anti-ISIS tweets given the pres-
ence of either an abbreviated form (“ISIS”) or the full name
(“Islamic State”)
breviated name generally indicates opposition, out of the 3.1
million tweets that we collected, 1.2 million and 1.8 million
tweets were supporting and opposing ISIS respectively. For
all tweeps, we scraped the last 3,200 tweets that they au-
thored, totaling 324 million tweets, along with other Twitter
profile information such as profile creation date and user de-
clared location.
From the full set of tweeps, we retained 56,960 who: 1)
authored 10 or more tweets (out of 3,200 tweets) that men-
tion ISIS, and 2) strictly used either the long name or strictly
used the abbreviated name of ISIS in at least 70% of their
tweets that mention the group.
These two conditions were meant to ensure that we per-
form our study on tweeps who are both engaged in the topic
and have voiced clear positions towards ISIS. To validate
the definiteness of user positions (pro- or anti-ISIS) based
on the two conditions, we had the same judge automati-
cally label 50 random tweeps from each group. The judge
labeled tweeps as pro- or anti-ISIS based on the tweets that
they authored mentioning the group. We found that all 100
tweeps were correctly labeled, which suggests that the con-
ditions yield high labeling precision. Through this, we auto-
matically labeled 11,332 users as pro-ISIS and 45,628 users
as anti-ISIS. The tweeps meeting these conditions authored
123 million (out 324 million we collected).
Pro/Anti ISIS Tweet Counts and Temporal
Trends
In this section, we explore the temporal tweeting trends for
those who support or oppose ISIS. We attempt to correlate
these trends with events that happened during the period of
study. Figure 3 shows the tweet counts for both groups from
Oct. 13, 2014 to Dec. 31, 2014.
Figure 3 shows the relative percentages of pro- and anti-
ISIS tweets. The counts for both groups are weakly corre-
lated with a Pearson’s r of 0.27. Pearson’s r ranges between
-1 (complete negative correlation) and 1 (complete positive
correlation) and 0 implies no correlation. As can be seen,
the fraction of pro-ISIS tweets steadily increased over the
time period, while anti-ISIS tweets has steadily decreased.
However, it is not clear if the increase in pro-ISIS tweets is
organic or not. Figure 3 lists some of the major news stories
that appeared on the days when there were peaks for ISIS
supporters and opposers. As can be seen from the events,
anti-ISIS tweets generally peaked when news of ISIS hu-
man rights violations emerged such as the killing of hostage,
isil-isis-islamic-state-daesh-whats-difference-1693495,
http://www.independent.co.uk/9750629.html, and http://cnn.
com/2014/09/09/world/meast/isis-isil-islamic-state/
accounts of torture, or reports of the enslavement of Yazidi
women. On the other hand, pro-ISIS tweets generally peaked
in conjunction with the release of propaganda videos and
major military achievements. Though some connection be-
tween events on the ground and shifts in the relative popu-
larity can be observed, it is not clear how strong it is, and it
is very hard to determine causality.
Figure 4 shows the top 15 peaking hashtags in association
with pro- and anti-ISIS tweets, along with their frequency
counts. To obtain the top hashtags, we: a) extracted the hash-
tags from the original set of 3.1 million tweets; b) eliminated
hashtags that are name variants of ISIS; c) we obtained and
sorted hashtag-per-day counts; and d) we retained the top
15 that had the highest hashtag-per-day counts (and not the
global count over the entire period). In other words, if a
hashtag was used 1,000 times in one day, it would be pre-
ferred over another that was used about 100 times everyday
for 20 days.
The upper part of Figure 4 shows the top 15 hash-
tags (translated from Arabic) used by pro-ISIS tweeps
cover a variety of topics such as (each hashtag is
followed by its rank): threats and claims of vic-
tory against opponents as in #ISIS to liberate KSA
(1), #ISIS ousts US sectary of defense (7), and
#killing of Battat (a Shia cleric who opposed them);
media organizations #Furqan Foundation (2) and
#Itisam Foundation (12); media releases as in #de-
spite the disbelievers (3) and #spreading his CV (referring
to the leader of ISIS) (8); spreading news of battles and ar-
eas under their control as in #Sinai State (6), #Alkhair State
(9), #Ein Islam (ISIS’s name of Kobani) (13), and #Ramady
(15); and the most interesting of them is using popular
hashtags, even ones used by their opponents, to spread their
message as in #we are all Moaz (the pilot of the Jordanian
plane that ISIS downed) (5) and #Helal Sydney (refers to a
soccer match) (14).
The top 15 hashtags (translated from Arabic) used by
anti-ISIS tweeps cover: exposure of their violence as in
#ISIS stones woman (1), #torturing women (10), #Syd-
ney hostages (8), and #Ahsaa shooting (11); using ISIS as
a negative label for other groups as in #MB UK (Mus-
lim Brotherhood, United Kingdom) (2); virtual and phys-
ical threats against ISIS as in #banning ISIS on Twitter
(5) and #Egypt cemetary for ISIS (9); using pro-ISIS hash-
tags to attack the group as in #KSA army rule (4) and
#Kurds are Jewish slaves (12); and attacking their sym-
pathizers and leaders as in #Naef Elthaqafi (13) and
#Abu Bakr Baghdadi (15) respectively.
Some of the top hashtags used by by pro- and anti-ISIS
tweeps seem to be consistent with news stories that appeared
on the days when pro- and anti-ISIS tweet-counts peaked re-
spectively. It seems that the top interests of both groups are
rather different, except for one incident when an ISIS affil-
iate group attacked the Egyptian Army in Sinai, leading to
the hashtags #Sinai State and #Egypt cemetary for ISIS for
the pro- and anti-ISIS tweeps respectively. There has been
discussion in the media about the brutal tactics of ISIS9. Our
9
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/25/opinion/
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Figure 3: Pro/anti ISIS tweet counts
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Figure 4: Top hashtags used by pro- and anti- ISIS tweeps with their counts
observations suggest that they seem to galvanize opposition
against them, and it is unclear if it is an effective recruitment
tool.
Classifying and Analyzing Pro/Anti ISIS
Tweeps
Classifying Tweeps
Given the users we have identified as being most likely sup-
porting or opposing ISIS based on the whether they refer
to ISIS (# «@X) or the Islamic State (# éJ
ÓCB @
éËðYË@), we
were interested in classifying users as potentially support-
ing or opposing ISIS before they explicitly wrote a tweet
identifying their stance. As mentioned earlier, we automat-
ically labeled 11,332 and 45,628 tweeps as supporting or
opposing ISIS. Of 11,332 supporting tweeps, 4,307 of them
indicated support for ISIS starting from the creation dates.
Thus, we could not use them for prediction, and we were left
with 7,225 tweeps. For balance during classification, we ran-
domly picked an equal number of anti-ISIS tweeps whose
accounts were active prior to their opposition to ISIS. We
used the tweeps with the tweets they authored prior to the
first supporting/opposing tweets for classification. We ran-
cruickshank-storer-hamid-bakos-isis/
domly selected 10% of the tweeps for validation, and we per-
formed 10-fold cross-validation on the remaining 90%. For
classification, we trained a Support Vector Machine (SVM)
classifier using the SVMLight implementation with a linear
kernel with default parameters. For features, we used bag-
of-words features, including individual terms, hashtags and
user mentions. The Arabic text of the tweets was processed
using the method described by Darwish et al. (2012) to nor-
malize the text and to handle word elongations. We com-
bined all the tweets for a single user into one document, and
we used all the tokens in the combined-tweets documents as
features. We used the validation set to perform SVM thresh-
old adjustment. The threshold was adjusted to maximize the
classification effectiveness (F1 score).
Table 2 lists classification results of potential supporters
and opposers of ISIS based on the tweets they authored prior
to their first tweet explicitly stating their position. As re-
sults show, both groups are quite separable from each other,
even before they voice explicit support or opposition, and
the classifier can distinguish between them with relatively
high accuracy.
Next, we were interested in understanding the underlying
features that makes the two groups separable. So, we con-
sulted the SVM classification model to identify the most dis-
tinguishing 50 hashtags that the classifier used to determine
 Pro-ISIS Anti-ISIS 
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Figure 5: Tagclouds for the most indicative 50 hashtags of ISIS support and opposers in the period before and after they started
tweeting about ISIS
Precision Recall F1-measure
Pro-ISIS 89.6 83.7 86.6
Anti-ISIS 84.7 90.3 87.4
Average 87.2 87.0 87.0
Table 2: Classification results of potential ISIS support-
ers/opposers
if a person would potentially support ISIS and most distin-
guishing 50 hashtags that would indicate future opposition.
We opted to use hashtags instead of individual word for this
exploration, because they are more demonstrative of under-
lying topics. Figure 5 shows tag clouds for the hashtags for
future pro- and anti-ISIS users in the before condition. The
size of each hashtag in the cloud is indicative of its weight
as assigned by the classifier.
By examining the top 50 hashtags that are most indica-
tive of future ISIS support, we observe the following (each
hashtag is followed by its rank on the list):
• Most hashtags are political and are specifically related
to support of the Arab Spring and opposition to regional
regimes. These hashtags by country are as follows (trans-
lated to English):
- Egypt: #elect the pimp (4 – hashtag referring Sisi
that emerged during the Egyptian presidential elections),
#Morsi (7 – ousted Egyptian president), #Rami Lakkah
(13 – Egyptian politician and businessman), #Ra-
bia Adawiyya (29 – sit-in that was disbanded violently
by security forces), #Rabia (35), #the free 25 (47 – refer-
ring to Jan. 25 uprising)
- Saudi Arabia: #Alburayda sit-in (5), #Saud clan (9 –
Saudi rulers), #the people say their word (18), #finish-
ing off (23 – opposition campaign)
- Iraq: #Iraqi Spring (12),
- Libya: #Libya (6), #Feb17 (17 – start date of 2011 revo-
lution), #Gaddafi (45)
- Syria: #Annusra Front (19 – rebel group), #Levant (25),
and #million man march for Qusair (32 – Syrian city)
- Kuwait: #National dignity march (24 – protest move-
ment in 2012)
- Jordan: #Jordan star (31 – protest movement)
• Hashtags relating to conflict areas in the Muslim world,
namely: #ajagaza (1 – Aljazeera Arabic, Gaza), #Mali
(40), and #Qassam (44 – Hamas military wing)
• There are a few hashtags relating to civil-rights or its vi-
olation, namely: #incarceration (11, 43) and #prisoners
(41). This is in line with previous research that shows that
imprisonment and torture seem to “fan the flames” of vi-
olence (Bellamy 2009).
• Only three hashtag is indicative of anything religious
namely #tweet Islamic (16), #Islam (34), and #remem-
brance (49)
• One interesting hashtag was #a million atheist Arabs that
was used for discussions with atheists.
In short, most of the hashtags are related to support for
the Arab Spring, opposition to existing regimes in the Mid-
dle East, solidarity or concern over hotspots in the Muslim
worlds, and disillusionment with the current status quo.
As for the top 50 hashtags that are most indicative of fu-
ture opposition to ISIS, we observe that:
• Most of the tweets are general like the one about
an exhibition in Abu Dhabi (1), #Instagram (16),
#Reem baklava from Istanbul (29), etc.
• There are some hashtags expressing political views,
namely:
- support for the coup in Egypt: #long live Egypt (9 – slo-
gan of pro-Sisi supporters) and #our country movement
(30 – a pro-Sisi movement)
- support of UAE’s political leadership:
#UAE international performance (32), #civil service
(35), #Mohamed bin Zayed among best Islamic leaders
(44)
- support of Gaza, which is the only sentiment in
common with the other group: #Gaza (13 and 50),
#Gaza under attack (20), and #I am with Hamas (42)
- Animosity towards the Muslim Brotherhood: #Brother-
hood
As can be seen, most hashtags are not indicative of of any
political stances except support for the regimes in UAE and
in Egypt. Members of this group share concern with the fu-
ture supporters of ISIS in their support for Gaza.
Whereas the previous analysis was done on classifiers
built before users expressed support or opposition to ISIS,
we also built a separate SVM classifier exclusively using
data after they expressed their opinion. Though this does not
directly reveal anything about the antecedents of support, it
still helps paint a clearer picture on how the supporters dif-
fer from the opposition. For this analysis, tweets contain-
ing a reference to ISIS were ignored as, trivially, otherwise
the corresponding hashtags would have been the most dis-
criminating features. Figure 5 in the after condition shows
tag clouds for the most distinguishing hashtags for current
pro- and anti-ISIS users respectively. Again, we obtained the
hashtags from the SVM classification model.
By examining the top 50 hashtags that are most indicative
of current ISIS support, we note the following:
• Similar to hashtags that they used before declaring their
support of ISIS, many of the hashtags express animosity
towards different regimes in the Middle East. Some of
these hashtags by country are:
- Kuwait: #Bodoon schools (2 – Bodoon are persons
without nationality), #Bodoon (33), #join the well (37 –
protest movement)
- Saudi Arabia: #the people say their word (3),
#Saud clan (14), #kidnapping of Saudi women (20 –
about government incarceration of women), #trial drama
(35 – mocking trials of opposition figures), #kid-
nap of May Altalq and Amina Alrashed (42 – same as
#20), #salary not enough (50 – opposition campaign) -
Egypt: #Rami Lakkah (4), #Muslim youth uprising (8
– a day of protest in Egypt), #elect the pimp (12), #Sisi
(15), and #Rabia (21).
• ISIS specific hashtags including:
- Media releases: #Despite the disbelievers (6) and
#charge of Ansar (49 – about attack in Sinai against
Egyptian army)
- Other names for ISIS: #the state (7 and 47),
#Islamic caliphate state (13), #Islamic caliphate (30),
#State of Islam (32), #Caliphate state (41)
- Battles related: #Ein Alarab (18 – Arabic name for
Kobani, a town witnessing ongoing battles), #Ein Islam
(22 – ISIS’s name for Kobani)
- ISIS Media organizations: #Alfurqn Foundation (28),
#Islam Post (32)
• Another carry over hashtag from the before condition is
#incarcerated (23).
Among the hashtags indicative of opposition to ISIS,
there seems to be three main themes, as follows:
• The first themes includes supportive references to
various rebel or Islamic groups in Syria such as
#Alnusra Front (2), #Islamic Front (4), #martyr-
dom of Ahrar Alsham leaders (9), #Army of Islam (12),
#Brotherhood in Syria (15), #Ahrar Alsham (35). This
can be attributed to ISIS attacks on opposition groups in
Syria.
• The second theme includes:
1) support for some Middle Eastern regimes,
namely United Arab Emirates as in #Za-
yed cultural exhibition (20 – Zayed is the UAE founder),
#love UAE and its leaders (27), #this is UAE (28),
#we love Bu-khaled the Arab leader (44 – Bu Khaled
is vice president of UAE), Egyptian military regime as
in #Egyptian army are men (8), #long live Egypt (16),
and #our country movement (39), and Saudi Arabia as
in #Twitter army (18) and #gunfire in Ahsaa (36 – an
attack in Eastern Saudi Arabia).
2) opposition to various Islamic groups as in #fe-
male Organization (14) and #Brotherhood of Syria and
ISIS as in #khawarej (37 – a deviant sect in Islamic
history) and #Baghdadi (42 – leader of ISIS).
3) opposition to regimes that are perceived to support
Islamic groups such as #Zaman Arabic (5 – opposition
publication in Turkey) and #why oh Qatar (19)
• The third theme seem to be Shia related as in #Hus-
sein lives on (34 – revered Shia historical figure).
Example Tweets and Tweeps
To provide a better qualitative understanding of our data set,
we provide some pairs of before/after tweets for ISIS sup-
porters (Table 3) and ISIS opposition (Table 4).
Among the ISIS supporters, tweep T1 seemingly sup-
ported the 2011 Egyptian revolution and is probably not
an Islamist. Tweep T3 opposed the military coup in Egypt.
Tweeps T2 and T5 supported different militant groups in
Syria and ended up supporting ISIS. In the case of tweep T5,
he transitioned from supporting to opposing the Free Syrian
Army. Tweep T4 was a supporter of the 2011 Libyan revo-
lution.
Among the ISIS opposition, tweeps T6, T7, and T8 sup-
ported different Muslim rebel groups in Syria and ended
up opposing ISIS. Tweep T9 supports the current Egyptian
regime and opposes the Muslim Brotherhood. Tweep T10 is
seemingly a Shia fighting against ISIS.
Geographic Distribution of Tweeps
Apart from what users tweets, their geographic location is
also expected to be related to whether they are more likely
to support or oppose ISIS. To test whether there is indeed ge-
ographic variation in patterns of support and opposition we
used the users’ self-declared locations to map them to coun-
tries. For the users labeled as anti-ISIS, 46% had provided a
non-empty location string in their profile. This fraction was
only 21% for those labeled as pro-ISIS. We then matched the
user declared locations to a dataset containing country ID’s
for the 10,000 most commonly used Arabic user locations
from a large set of tweets (Mubarak and Darwish 2014).
Tweep Date Tweet (translated)
T1
May 25, 2012 Don’t be surprised if it rains today ... martyrs are spitting on us
Nov. 9, 2014 Preliminary schizophrenia: I like ISIS, but I want to watch Chris Nolan’s new movie
Nov. 17, 2014 The gazes of Bashar’s soldiers before slaughter by #Islamic State in #despite the disbelivers
T2 Aug. 26, 2013 Best pics from the liberation of Khanaser (Syrian town) #Syria #Alnusra Front #Ahrar AlshamNov. 14, 2014 The strike of the Islamic State’s lions, Sinai State
T3 April 9, 2014 #mb europe #elect the pimp Some of the military coup crimes in #Egypt (link)Nov. 17, 2014 Praise be to Allah, support for #Islamic State in Indonesian mosques
T4 Feb. 24, 2011 JUST IN: Benghazi cleaning the streets! (link) #Libya #GaddafiCrimes #feb17Sept. 25, 2014 Pictures of the dead of Crusader Arab alliance against Islamic State (link)
T5 March 9, 2013 An important message from your brother in Syria #jihad #Alnusra Front #Free Syrian Army (link)Feb. 19, 2014 Islamic State retakes Babila (Syrian town) after #Free Syrian Army betrayal
Table 3: Before (light gray) and after (white) tweets from tweeps who end up supporting ISIS
Tweep Date Tweet (translated)
T6 Nov. 12, 2014 Aftermath of Crusader-Arab alliance in Homs countryside #Alnusra Front #HomsNov. 15, 2014 Baghdadi state media #ISIS not different from Bashar state media, all in deceitful swamp
T7 Sept. 9, 2014 Saddened for loss of heroes # martyrdom of Ahrar Alsham leaders. Same George Bush strategy:long dirty war
Oct. 30, 2014 ISIS an internal Muslim problem, to be fixed by Muslim hands, not Americans or their Arab puppets
T8 Aug. 17, 2014 Alnusra Front: pictures of your brothers in #resilient Murek (Syrian city) (link)Aug. 23, 2014 Disgusting ISIS show to sell their pathetic goods (link)
T9 Sept.1 2014 Hilary Clinton agrees with Muslim Brotherhood to establish ISIS #ar-rest ISIS Saudi popular demand
Oct. 14 2014 Why the dead children ! Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS 2 sides of 1 coin #criminal brotherhood
#long live Egypt #mb uk
T10 Oct. 24 2014 Don’t let ISIS distract you from worship. This is there goal. #Hussein lives onOct. 27 2014 From the battlefield against ISIS #Hussein lives on (pic)
Table 4: Tweets from anti-ISIS tweeps “after” showing opposition to ISIS
If a location is ambiguous, ex. refers to multiple countries
such as “UK and Syria”, then it was ignored. To further
increase the recall of mapped locations, we also used Ya-
hoo Placemaker10. Manual inspection showed that this tool
worked well for strings in European languages, but it per-
formed poorly for most Arabic strings. Hence, we decided to
only pass strings with letters in the Latin alphabet to Yahoo
Placemaker. As for annotation, strings where multiple coun-
tries were detected were ignored. Using this procedure, we
managed to map 52% of non-empty locations for anti-ISIS
tweeps and 21% for pro-ISIS tweeps. This means that 24%
of the anti-ISIS tweeps could be mapped to a country, com-
pared to 4.4% for pro-ISIS tweeps. The number of country-
labeled pro-ISIS tweeps is rather small, so any further statis-
tics on them are likely inconclusive. As one might expect,
tweeps in the pro-ISIS group are less likely to put real non-
empty locations, potentially due to fear of being prosecuted.
Their declared locations are generally nondescript such as
“in the wide world”. Table 5 shows the count of countries
that we were able to map tweeps to.
Though large countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and
10
https://developer.yahoo.com/yql/console/#, then
geo.placemaker.
Pro-ISIS Anti-ISIS
Saudi Arabia (144) Saudi Arabia (4,675)
Iraq (56) Kuwait (1,064)
Syria (49) Egypt (1,060)
Egypt (39) UAE (753)
Kuwait (15) Iraq (474)
Qatar (13) Bahrain (429)
Yemen (12) United Kingdom (392)
Jordan (12) Lebanon (321)
Libya (10) Qatar (255)
Algeria (9) Syria (183)
Table 5: Geographic distribution of support and opposition,
derived from self-declared Twitter location strings. Only the
top 10 locations for both groups are shown.
Iraq appear prominently in both lists, there are still notewor-
thy differences in the relative ranking. Looking at the top
five countries for the (# pro-ISIS/# anti-ISIS) ratio, one ob-
tains Syria (0.27), Yemen (0.20), Libya (0.13), Iraq (0.11)
and Jordan (0.10). The higher the ratio, the higher the rel-
ative support for ISIS. Except for Jordan, all of these are
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Figure 6: Distribution of users’ focus for pro-ISIS vs. anti-
ISIS
countries are suffering from on-going military conflicts. The
two biggest countries in terms of mapped users, Saudi Ara-
bia and Egypt, are both fairly far down the list with (0.03)
and (0.04). Only countries with at least 10 mapped pro-ISIS
users were used for this analysis. Still, the analysis is ulti-
mately based on a fairly small number of pro-ISIS users and
should be more viewed as a proof-of-concept analysis.
Focus and Time Analysis of Tweeps
In this section we examine how often pro- and anti-ISIS
tweeps tweet about ISIS and the typical creation of their
Twitter account. Figure 6 shows the distribution of ISIS re-
lated tweets for both groups. As can be observed, though the
number of pro-ISIS tweeps is significantly smaller than anti-
ISIS tweeps, pro-ISIS tweeps dedicate a much large portion
of the their tweeting activity to ISIS. On average pro-ISIS
tweeps tweet about ISIS 20% of the time compared to 4.5%
of the time for anti-ISIS tweeps.
As for when the Twitter accounts were created, Figure 7
provides the distribution of creation dates for both groups.
Concerning the anti-ISIS group, there are two major spikes.
The first is in late 2011/early 2012, which is probably caused
by the Arab Spring. The second one that appears in mid
2014 looks interesting and we cannot readily explain it.
More investigation of this is required. For pro-ISIS tweeps,
nearly 32% of them joined Twitter in September and Octo-
ber 2014. This spike coincides with the commencement of
the US bombing campaign against ISIS. However, other fac-
tors maybe at play and this requires further investigation.
Limitations
Though our study is closely related to studies understanding
the psychology of militants and their supporters, our focus in
this paper is on ideological supporters, not the actual fighters
on the ground. In a sense, we are looking more at the “soil”
on which violent behavior can flourish. We believe that such
a broader view is crucial to finding solutions that go beyond
the identification and elimination of individuals.
One of the strengths of our study is that we look at tweets
in Arabic, whereas social media studies in general tend to be
English-only and US-centric. Most ISIS members are after
all Arabs. However, this also means that our studies does not
include any recruiting attempts or press-release-type mes-
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Figure 7: Distribution of users’ joining date on Twitter for
pro-ISIS vs. anti-ISIS
sages that are deliberately aimed at audiences in the West.
Studying such marketing efforts would be interesting in its
own right, but deviates from the motivation of our study to
understand the antecedents of ISIS support.
Our data collection involved using both the Twitter
Streaming API and, after identifying tweets and users of in-
terest, the Twitter REST API to obtain historic information.
However, due to the temporal difference of when these two
data sets where collected, some accounts had been deleted
by the user, had their privacy settings changed to “pro-
tected” or were suspended by Twitter by the time we col-
lected the historic data. There has been media reports that
suggest that Twitter frequently suspends ISIS related ac-
counts(Shane and Hubbard 2014). Concretely we failed to
get the data for nearly 15 thousand out of 180 thousand
tweeps, meaning that our data set is probably biased towards
less offensive and less openly hateful users. Despite this
shortcoming, our classification results shows that even this
set of “slightly more politically correct” users could be eas-
ily told apart. Slightly less dramatic than the deletion or sus-
pension of complete accounts, users themselves can delete
individual tweets. So if an ISIS supporter was now embar-
rassed by posting about Britney Spears several years ago, he
could go back and delete these tweets. Though a theoretical
possibility, we do not expect this kind of behavior to be fre-
quent. A more frequent limitation is the result of Twitter’s
restriction which only provides up to the most recent 3,200
tweets for a user. Hence, for more active users we could not
go back in their history as much as we would have liked.
Needless to say that Twitter users are not necessarily rep-
resentative of the general population. But especially in these
domains surveys would also suffer from non-response bias
as many people might prefer not to openly voice their sup-
port for a militant organization. In that sense Twitter with its
perceived anonymity lends itself to study such phenomena.
The fact that our findings concerning the frustration with
failed Arab Spring revolutions are in line with previous re-
search (Kohlmann and Alkhouri 2014; Plous and Zimbardo
2005) also suggests that our results are not mere artifacts of
a user selection bias.
The representativeness of our study could potentially be
improved by broadening the user base by inferring a users
likelihood to support or oppose ISIS. Classification could
use a mix of content and network features and, unlike our
current classifier, be applied to users for which the ground
truth is not known and might never express their opinion
on the topic. Of course, attempting to read the minds of the
“silent majority” is notoriously difficult (Cohen and Ruths
2013).
Our definition of the “before” period could also be seen
as a limitation. As the cut-off date between the “before” and
“after” period is different for each user and depends on the
date of their first on-topic tweet, it is hard to generalize to the
population level. This also relates to the possibility that the
temporal dynamics are likely to change over time and that
the early supporters might differ from the supporters joining
later. The fact that our classifier achieves such good perfor-
mance suggests though that there are not too many temporal
subgroups with vastly different characteristics, though this
could be investigated in future work.
Conclusion
In this paper, we used Twitter data to study the antecedents
of ISIS support. At a global, temporal level, we observed
some connection between spikes in support or opposition
and reports of territorial gains/losses or accounts of torture,
forced female enslavement, and similar news. The clear-
est trend, however, was that ISIS supporters seemed to join
Twitter just for the purpose of voicing their support, as could
be seen both from temporal concentration, as well as their
topical focus on the matter. At a personal, historic level, we
managed to predict future support or opposition of ISIS with
87% accuracy, using only tweets from the pre-ISIS period.
Looking at discriminating hashtags suggested that a major
source of support for ISIS stems from frustration with the
missteps of the Arab Spring. As for opposition to ISIS, it is
linked with support for other rebel groups, mostly in Syria,
that have been targeted by ISIS, support for existing Mid-
dle Eastern regimes, and Shia sectarianism. We also showed
some of the interesting geographical and temporal trends for
both pro- and anti-ISIS tweeps.
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